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The notion of self is one of the most elusive in contemporary philosophy. 
It is a concept with many layers and connotations and its analysis 
generates a vast amount of literature and a large number of disputes in 
philosophical, psychological as well as neuroscientific circles. What 
exactly is the self? What are its essential characteristics? Is it material? Is 
it identical to the body or could it move from one body to another? Is 
there anything like the self in the first place? Can we examine it by 
introspection? How do we reidentify selves in time? Is the self the bearer 
of agency and responsibility? Could I become someone else? 
Boran Berčić has edited the collection Perspectives on the Self with the 
aim to shed light on some of the facets of the self. The collection, 
according to the editor, results from the activities of several philosophers 
at the Department of Philosophy in Rijeka and a conference on the self, 
which was held in Rijeka the spring of 2016. 
There are 17 papers in the collection, 12 are authored by philosophers 
associated with the Department of Philosophy in Rijeka or other Croatian 
philosophy departments, and 5 by authors from UK, Serbia, Finland, 
Hungary and USA. 
The collection is divided into 6 sections with an extensive introduction by 
the editor, who provides a brief overview of the claims and arguments 
made in each paper. The sections focus on the relationship between the 
self and the body, self-knowledge, the history of the concept of self, self 
as an agent, the very existence of self and general metaphysical and 
linguistic issues involved in the concept. There are two to four papers in 
each section. 
The first section contains papers by Eric Olson, Miljana Milojević and 
Zdenka Brzović. 
In his paper The Central Dogma of Transhumanism Olson argues against 
a claim frequently made by transhumanists, according to which it is 
possible to scan the synaptic matrix of the human brain and upload the 
information to a computer, thus guaranteeing the survival of the person.  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Olson argues that this supposition leads directly to the branching 
problem, which is well-known from classical objections to the 
psychological continuity theory of human persistence. Also, he shows 
that the transhumanist claim makes unintelligible the difference between 
a person being uploaded to a computer and a new person 
indistinguishable from the original one being programmed in the 
computer. Olson then identifies a deeper problem with the transhumanist 
claim: people are animals and the process of scanning and uploading will 
simply not move an animal to a computer, that is, guarantee the survival 
of the animal. Finally, Olson assesses three alternative accounts of human 
identity – the pattern view, the constitution view and the temporal-parts 
view. He argues that the first one is inconsistent with the fact that we 
change, the second one does not actually deal with the above problems, 
and the last one does not give us what we want from survival. 
Milojević holds a very different theory of human identity in her 
Embodied and Extended Self. Assuming functionalism about mental 
states, the psychological view of the self and the extended mind thesis, 
she argues that the self can actually be more extended than the body, even 
including objects external to the body, such as a notebook. First, she uses 
standard thought experiments to show that neither animalism, nor the 
soul theory is the correct account of human identity. Second, she 
considers arguments against the psychological theory and concludes that 
it has fewer ontological commitments and explains more of our 
intuitions. After that she defends a form of realizer functionalism, 
according to which mental states are the typical realizers of the functions 
identified with the mental states. However, she further argues that unlike 
in the brain theory, the realization base of the functions can include 
entities other than brain tissue and that the self can extend beyond the 
human brain and even the human body. This conclusion is reached by 
considering Andy Clark and David Chalmers’ supposition that cognitive 
processes can be realized in non-neural realizers (the extended cognition 
view) and that some of these processes constitute narrative 
autobiographical memories, which, according to Milojević, track personal 
identity. 
Brzović returns to the biological account of the self in her paper The 
Immunological Self and attempts to define an individual organism. She 
starts with several implausible definitions, such as ones based on 
functional integration or autonomy. The main part of the paper is spent 
over immunological definitions. Brzović critically assesses the self-
nonself theory, according to which an organism is everything that is 
tolerated by the immune system. She shows that there are 
counterexamples to this theory and that it cannot account for the 
phenomena of autoreactivity, immune tolerance and symbiosis. Brzović 
also considers other theories. The systemic theory of immunity is rejected 
as too vague to be useful. Polly Matzinger’s danger theory lacks precision  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in the definition of danger. And finally, the continuity theory by Thomas 
Pradeu embodies a problem common to all of the immunological 
theories: it actually assumes that we can already identify an organism to 
be able to delineate those factors that trigger an immune response. 
The next part of the collection focuses on epistemological issues. 
Nenad Miščević ponders over the question whether self-knowledge has 
any value. In his The Value of Self-Knowledge he distinguishes between 
the direct knowledge of inner phenomenal states and the, mostly 
inferential, knowledge of one’s causal powers, and assesses these from 
the perspective of instrumental value as well as intrinsic value. He 
believes that both the knowledge of phenomenal states and the 
knowledge of causal powers clearly have instrumental value. Insensitivity 
to pain and thirst or complete lack of knowledge of what one can cause 
and what one’s reactions to external causes are is evidently inconsistent 
with the survival of such a deprived individual. But both types of 
knowledge also have intrinsic value. Drawing from John McDowell, 
Miščević maintains that if we did not have epistemic access to our own 
mental states we would turn into zombies and stop being who we are. 
Knowledge of phenomenal states is thus constitutive of our selves. 
Knowledge of our causal powers is also intrinsically valuable, according 
to Miščević, because such form of self-inquisitiveness is a virtue that 
contributes to the authentic self. 
Luca Malatesti has contributed with a paper titled The Self-Ascription of 
Conscious Experience. As the title suggests he is interested in the process 
in which we ascribe conscious experiences to ourselves, and he takes as 
his model examples the experiences of color. He argues that a necessary 
condition for a thinker to be able to attribute conscious experience to 
herself is that she have the relevant concept, and having the concept is 
preconditioned by actually having the relevant experience. Malatesti thus 
rejects several theories in philosophy of mind, such as behaviorism, 
which are inconsistent with this supposition. Malatesti then analyzes what 
he calls the central transition, that is, the transition from having a certain 
experience to the knowledge that one is having that experience. He 
rejects the inner sense theory, because it relies on what he takes to be an 
implausible assumption that we have direct awareness of the self and the 
conscious experiences. He also questions the idea that the capacities that 
we employ in having conscious experience are the same as those that 
enable us to formulate self-ascriptions of conscious experience. Malatesti 
then formulates at least a necessary condition for the transition: the 
transition from judgments about how things appear to be to self-
ascriptions of the relevant experiences requires the capacities that are 
involved in the mastery of observational concepts. Finally, he turns to the 
concept of self that is implied in such self-ascriptions. Although the 
concept seems to be implicitly present in each conscious experience, 
Malatesti argues that a richer notion is necessary. He sides with Alan  
81
Radim Bělohrad
Millar and claims that the mastery of the concept of conscious experience 
involves the capacity to think about ourselves as entities that have sense 
organs and internal mental states that are determined by interactions with 
certain sorts of stimulation of these sense organs. 
The next part of the collection maps certain historical views of the notion 
of self, offering papers on the accounts of the notion in logical positivism, 
Brentano, Buddhist Philosophy and Ancient Philosophy. 
Boran Berčić in his Logical Positivists on the Self analyzes two broad 
questions: 1) What is the prominent logical positivists’ opinion of 
Descartes’ notion of Cogito? 2) What positive accounts of the self did 
they develop? First, Berčić offers various interpretations of Cogito and 
finds most plausible the interpretation according to which it is an 
inference from an attribute (thinking) to a substance (the thinker). Then 
he documents the key logical positivists’ arguments rejecting the 
inference. He shows that Moritz Schlick considered it to be a mere 
stipulative definition, Rudolf Carnap dismissed it as a meaningless claim, 
because it cannot be formulated in classical logic which does not contain 
the predicate for existence, Weinberg considered the inference a 
tautology, and Alfred Ayer dismissed it as invalid, because, in his view, 
the presence of thinking does not necessarily imply the existence of the 
subject of this event. In the second half of the paper Berčić analyzes the 
theories of the self that the logical positivists offered. He shows that for 
Carnap it was a class of elementary experiences, for Ayer it was a logical 
construction out of sense-experiences and for Reichenbach an abstractum 
composed of concreta and illata. The logical positivists were thus 
reductionists about the self. In the final part Berčić shows how they dealt 
with a classical objection to reductionism according to which it is a 
circular theory. 
In his Brentano on Self-Consciousness, Ljudevit Hanžek brings an 
overview of Franz Brentano’s thoughts and arguments on the nature of 
consciousness and self-consciousness. Hanžek claims that Brentano’s 
thoughts on self-consciousness were related to his ideas about 
introspection. Brentano maintained that introspection of our mental states 
is an impossible process, because it would require the division of the 
subject into an observer and the observed, which he believed to be 
impossible. However, there is a mechanism by which the subject can 
become acquainted with her own mental states. Brentano calls it inner 
consciousness and contrasts it with inner observation, that is, 
introspection. Inner consciousness is a process in which the subject is 
aware of an object and simultaneously also peripherally aware of the 
mental state of awareness of this object. Hanžek then shows how 
Brentano refuted the Regress Argument threatening his position, and lists 
several arguments that Brentano used to support his position. Finally, 
Hanžek questions an alternative interpretation of Brentano’s position by 
Amie Thomasson and dismisses it as lacking support by textual evidence.  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In the following paper, The No-Self View in Buddhist Philosophy, Goran 
Kardaš brings insight into the Buddhist perspective on the self, that is, 
more precisely, the idea that there is no self as we typically think. Kardaš 
begins by characterizing Buddha as what we would call today a 
conventionalist about language and empiricist and verificationist in 
epistemology. Then he shows how this philosophical background led 
Buddha to see through the illusion that language items and syntactical 
relations correspond to objectively existing entities and events. A special 
instance of this illusion is the belief that the expression “I” actually 
denotes an entity – my self. Next Kardaš walks the reader through the 
process of reduction and elimination of the concept of self in Buddhist 
thought. The paper concludes by a brief overview of later developments 
in Buddhist philosophy.‑ 1
The last paper of this section focuses on the self in Ancient Philosophy, as 
the title suggests. The author Ana Gavran Miloš attempts to refute a line 
of thought in contemporary history of philosophy, according to which the 
Ancient Greeks did not have a concept of self equivalent to the modern, 
post-Cartesian notion of self predominant today. First, she characterizes 
the Cartesian notion of self as a self-conscious individual with a 
privileged access to her own mental states endowed with epistemic 
certainty about them. Next, she formulates a challenge according to 
which the Greeks did not have such a subjective-individualistic concept 
of self, because they discussed the notion of self under a wider problem 
of what it takes to be a human being objectively. Gavran Miloš then 
analyses the work of Plato, Aristotle and Epicurus to show that none of 
them considers the self, or the soul, in their terminology, to be such a 
subjective, self-conscious and epistemically privileged entity. However, 
the picture is different if we consider the purpose for which Ancient 
Greeks employed the concept of soul, namely for practical concerns in 
the pursuit of happiness. Here, the author claims, the notion of 
individuality finds its application, because the notion of eudaimonia is 
always a notion of individual eudaimonia, that is, one’s own happiness. 
Part IV of the collection focuses on the notion of agency and its relation 
to the central concept of the book. It consists of papers by Matej Sušnik, 
Filip Čeč and Marko Jurjako. 
In the paper Ideal Self in Non-Ideal Circumstances, Sušnik focuses on the 
complex relationship between reasons, motivation and justification of our 
actions. He adopts the Advice model of internalism about reasons in 
claiming that one’s reasons for action are dependent on the advice of 
one’s ideal self. A challenge to this view is that the ideal self will 
sometimes be a markedly different being, and, as a result, a normal agent 
will not be able to do what the ideal agent would advise her to do. 
Further, in such a case it seems a mystery, according to Sušnik, why we 
should seek advice from our ideal selves, rather than just anyone ideally 
placed, which would undermine one tenet of internalism.  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In the end, Sušnik defends a solution developed by Williams, which does 
not depend on the concept of ideal self. Williams claims that an agent has 
a reason to do x only if there is a sound deliberative route from the 
agent’s motivational set to the agent’s doing x, regardless of the fact 
whether the agent is actually able to do x. Sušnik then applies this theory 
to several problematic cases to show its explanatory power. 
Čeč in his paper The Disappearing Agent takes the reader to the debate 
surrounding the notion of free will. He defends a form of event causal 
libertarianism, according to which a free action is the product of 
indeterministic, agent involving mental events or states, which do not rely 
on any specific form of selfhood (in contrast to agent causal 
libertarianism, which presupposes the self as an ontologically irreducible 
entity that has the capacity to cause free choices). Čeč develops the 
notion of torn decision – a decision in which the agent has two equally 
justified options and decides on one of them without resolving the 
conflict – to demonstrate an objection to event causal libertarianism. 
According to the disappearing agent objection, if the torn decision is not 
resolved by the agent, but by an indeterministic event, then the presence 
of the agent is quite irrelevant in the decision-making process, the agent 
disappears. In the second half of the paper Čeč lists and assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of several possible answers to the objection. He 
favors the response that the causal libertarian should acknowledge that 
something gets lost in the decision-making process and that there will be 
some residual arbitrariness, but that the agent will not disappear from the 
process, because the decision will still be attributable to her. 
In Agency and Reductionism about the Self, Jurjako discusses the 
relevance of agency for personal identity. His aim is to show that agency 
based accounts of personal identity are not necessarily incompatible with 
classical psychological continuity accounts. Jurjako begins with a 
detailed exposition of the psychological theory of personal identity and 
then shows how the theory is committed to reductionism about personal 
identity, that is, the idea that personal identity is not a further fact over 
and above facts about bodies, brains and their functions. Further, he 
shows that reductionism entails the fact that sometimes questions about 
personal identity will have indeterminate answers. In part 4 Jurjako 
focuses on what’s called the Extreme Claim, that is, the claim that if 
reductionism is correct, we have no reason to care about our own future, 
and presents Parfit’s solution, according to which the preservation of 
personal identity is not necessary for survival as long as psychological 
continuity is preserved. In the next part Jurjako turns to agency accounts 
of personal identity, with an emphasis on Korsgaard’s theory. He 
challenges the alleged incompatibility between Parfit’s and Korsgaard’s 
theories and shows that Parfit’s theory has the resources to account for 
agency. In addition, he argues that the resulting theory can avoid the 
Extreme Claim that threatens reductionism.  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Part V focuses on issues related to the existence of the self. In On Never 
Been Born, Marin Biondić analyzes value claims related to existence and 
non-existence, such as whether it is ever good to be brought into 
existence or whether not ever existing is preferable to existing at some 
time. Biondić employs the Reference Argument, according to which such 
claims only make sense if there is a referent of the subject of the value 
claim. If the claim does not refer, it is meaningless. As a result, it makes 
no sense to compare the value of existence versus non-existence for a 
person who never exists. Biondić further explores whether we could use 
an analogy of the comparative account of the badness of death to make 
value claims about prenatal existence and non-existence. He claims the 
analogical argument enables us to say that being brought into existence 
can be good or bad for an actual person, even if not being brought into 
existence could not possibly be bad for her (according to the Reference 
Argument). Biondić then discusses the arguments of two philosophers 
who challenge this reasoning. David Brenatar’s general argument that it 
is never better to come into existence is found only partially successful 
and Palle Yourgrau’s theory is rejected because it entails possibilism, 
which, according to Biondić, would be a high price to pay. 
In the next paper in this section Iris Vidmar analyzes the notion of 
fictional characters. She sets out by exploring a puzzling feature of 
fictional characters: they do not exist, but we still treat them a real in a 
sense. Vidmar then discusses logical, metaphysical and semantic theories 
of the existence of fictional characters, more specifically the realist ones, 
according to which fictional characters are real entities of a sort, and 
argues that these theories ignore the fact that fictional characters are 
artistic creations. She prefers to analyze them from literary-aesthetics 
perspectives, according to which their identity is indeterminate, open to 
interpretations, imbued with properties we recognize as human as well as 
purely artistic qualities. The main body of the paper consists of the 
author’s defense of a multi-layered account of the identity of fictional 
characters, according to which their identity consists of aspects related to 
the author’s activities in creating them and those involved in readers’ 
activities in responding to them. Along the way Vidmar discusses how 
fictional characters come into being and vanish, how they represent 
certain types and classes, and how their identity is relative to our 
interests. 
The final part of the collection offers three papers on the metaphysics and 
philosophy of language of the self. In the first paper of this section, 
Haecceity Today and with Duns Scotus: Property or Entity?, Márta 
Ujvári compares the current notion of primitive thisness, that is, 
haecceity, with its original counterpart developed by Duns Scotus. Ujvári 
shows that today haecceity is considered to be a non-qualitative property 
whose function is to guarantee trans-world identity and possible world 
individuation in modal metaphysics.  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Next, the author looks at the definitions of the concept of non-qualitative 
property and questions its identification with impure qualitative 
properties in the work of several authors. She also poses other challenges 
for the current concept: Can haecceities exist uninstantiated? Do they 
really guarantee trans-world identity? How do they connect to individual 
natures? Ujvári then presents an alternative understanding originating 
with Duns Scotus, who considered haecceity to be a principle of 
individuation. She shows that for Scotus, there was a difference between 
particularity and individuality, and that haecceities were the means of 
securing individuality. But since according to Scotus every unity 
presupposes a unity-maker with entitative status, haecceities must be 
entities, not properties, as it is claimed today. 
The penultimate paper in the collection, by Arto Mutanen, is titled Who 
am I ? The author claims that this question is in fact a cluster of questions 
with a host of different answers. First, he ties the question to the notion of 
identification and shows how it is handled in referentially opaque 
contexts. Second, he turns to the mind-body problem to distinguish the 
notion of identification from the notion of identity. Identity, he argues, is 
an ontological notion while identification is a methodological one, 
comprising the methods and techniques used to define an individual. In 
the second half of the paper the author assesses the approaches to 
identification by Hintikka, Russell and Gleason. 
The final piece is titled Meta-Representational Me. The author Takashi 
Yagisawa analyzes the notion of the first person singular, the notion of 
me. First, he argues that the concept of me is different from the concept of 
self and is not reducible to it. Then he inquires whether one could grasp 
the notion by means of the semantic analysis of “I”. He outlines Kaplan’s 
indexical theory of “I” and claims that in spite of its plausibility it fails to 
account for the notion of me. In particular, it cannot account for the fact 
that the notion of me only applies to me, while anyone can use “I” to refer 
to himself or herself. Also, Kaplan’s theory does not explain why “I” is a 
rigid designator, especially since its referent is not fixed causally, as is the 
case in typical “Kripkean” rigid designators. Yagisawa then goes on to 
argue that the notion of me is not a linguistic notion and that we can grasp 
the concept more adequately if we assume that it has its conceptual origin 
in representation. He shows that representation with the same content, 
object and recipient may occur in different ways and one specific form of 
representation is the me-way. Then he argues that we can extract the 
notion of me from the me-way representation by means of the so-called 
way-to-thing shift. Yagisawa concludes by giving a distinctive account of 
the rigidity of “I”. 
The collection Perspectives on the Self brings a representative selection 
of topics related to the notion of self. The editor Boran Berčić has done a 
good job collecting quality authors with a shared interest, and writing an 
introduction with a careful exposition of the contents of each paper. The  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level of the papers varies. Some are intended as an introduction to the 
subject, providing an overview of the various positions in the debate 
under discussion, thus being more suitable for undergraduate students. 
Others are more challenging and technical, with an intention to move the 
relevant debate forward. These will be appreciated by graduate students 
as well as academics. The collection is recommended for anyone who 
would like to get a quality exposition of the problems of the self in many 
of its various connotations.
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